In each EU member state where the Lisbon Treaty, a new constitution, is ratified without an electorate base (i.e.without referendum), the government has committed the unconstitutional act of overthrowing the constitution.
A constitution by its own definition never allows the act of overthrowing it. Not even a sovereign parliament with elected representatives and legislative supremacy has been authorised by the electorate to overthrow and invalidate the constitution under any circumstances, unless such parliament and the domestic law specifically claim to foster a system of “rule of man” rather than “rule of law”.
By overthrowing the constitution that has been the basis of their mandates with electorate legitimacy, the elected representatives have invalidated the basis of their legitimacy, thus terminated their mandates and elected status.
This research is based on directly comparing the Lisbon Treaty to a theoretical (generic) constitution. The conclusion of the research is that a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty should be a requirement in each EU-state because:
1) The Lisbon Treaty has all the substance to satisfy the criteria of being a new constitution, [Article 1]
2) A constitution never allows the act of overthrowing it [Article 2]
3) Democratic constitutionalisation process requires referendum as the basis of accepting a new constitution. [Article 3]
This approach is built on the objective definitions of political concepts, such as “democracy”, “constitutionalism” and “rule of law”; therefore the objective meanings of these political concepts are matched with the case of adopting a constitutional treaty of a new federal state, the “European Union” [Article 1], which claims to be guided by -both as per its existing treaties and in the Lisbon Treaty itself- democracy and rule of law. (10A). The first study [Article 1] provides a conceptual map between the contents of a theoretical constitution and the Lisbon Treaty itself. The findings in this article are that the Lisbon Treaty contains all the elements (provisions) of a generic constitution. Among the treaty’s provisions we find that the treaty abolishes our national borders, and this is just one of the main constitutional aspects.
Following the first conclusion that the Lisbon Treaty is a constitution, the second article [Article 2] provides conceptual evidence that the parliamentary ratification of the Lisbon Treaty – as an attempt to replace (overthrow) the national constitution – is an act of treason, an equivalent of coup d’état. Therefore the legal aspect of adopting the Lisbon Treaty – which has made the issue of the Lisbon Treaty a very complicated legal issue in the member states – should also be examined from the perspective of the condition if the law and certain parliamentary decisions satisfy the criteria of the concepts of democracy, rule of law and constitutionalism. [Article 3]
The democratic constitutional requirement is a concept that has primacy over the legal aspect, for the following reasons:
1. The constitutional requirement is not per se the written laws of a constitution – especially if a constitution is not codified, partly written and/or subject to change – but the very fact that a constitution, and the political system founded upon it, are not supposed to be altered in a manner that contradicts the fundamental concepts of constitutionalism and the mandate legitimacy of parliamentary sovereignty.
2. A constitution by its own definition never allows the act of overthrowing it. Not even a sovereign parliament with elected representatives and legislative supremacy has been authorised by the electorate to overthrow itself and the constitution under any circumstances, unless such parliament and the domestic law specifically claim to foster a system of “rule of man” rather than “rule of law”. (Regarding the specific case of the UK: the former promises of the PM are irrelevant, because a former promise of not overthrowing the constitution is be considered self-evident.)
3. The domestic laws can serve the constitutional aim to satisfy the principle of rule of law only as long as the laws support the principles of parliamentary democracy, i.e., as long as the laws do not undermine the most fundamental law of the constitution, which is the guarantee of the constitution to be the constitution and to maintain the current constitutional state of matters, i.e.
1) to be the law for all other laws
2) the guarantee that the parliament is obliged to act upon the constitution rather than overthrow it. These constitutional guarantees stand above all other laws, and it is not a legal but a conceptual guarantee, because it is a guarantee inherent in and derived from the objective, scientific principles of constitutionalism.
4. The requirement of constitutionalism exists even prior to founding a state and before recording any laws, because this requirement determines if the very process of adopting a new constitution is constitutional at all. [Article 3]
5. Another reason why the fundamental political principles and the conceptual/ philosophical basis of a political system has primacy over the legal aspects is because the domestic law itself in any country can be designed or altered to foster a totalitarian (rule of man) establishment as well.
Since this approach is based on the objective definitions of political concepts, such as “constitutionalism” and “rule of law”, to satisfy the objective meanings of these political concepts, i.e. to satisfy the constitutional criteria of the process of adopting a new federal constitution, in each EU-state, a referendum would be required. This is a general requirement and holds true with or without any member states actually observing these principles.
A referendum on the Lisbon Treaty is required in all EU-member states also because the concept of national sovereignty and citizens’ rights/obligations are attached to the legally binding state-founding concepts, such as the legally binding agreements on new common borders, and the Lisbon Treaty is the first EU treaty that includes constitutional provisions, such as common borders and other legally binding state-founding provisions [Article 1]. Without a referendum the citizens would be arbitrarily deprived of their current voting and other citizens’ rights and would be arbitrarily exposed to new obligations toward the authorities of a new state.
The justification of parliamentary ratification of the EU-elites stating
1) that the act of surrendering the member states’ sovereignty to the EU has been a gradual process rather than an abrupt action
2) that the former EU-treaties have been accepted without referendums
is invalid for the following reasons:
Within the new common borders of the new state, the citizens of the member states, would for the first time be legally bound to obey the directives of the new federal state (EU) that is being founded by the Lisbon Treaty, even though many of these directives will be imposed upon the citizens in the future and gradually -as projected by the self-amending nature of the treaty, and unnoticeably, via the mediation of the national parliament, which -as per the treaty- will be obliged to follow the EU’s decisions. Furthermore, many of these new citizens’ rights and obligations will be subject to future amendments by the EU’s authorities, due to the Treaty’s general self amending competence.
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